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Abstract.	   Transference implies the actualization of the analyst in the 
analytic encounter. Lacan developed this through the syntagm “the 
presence of the analyst”. However, two completely different presences 
emerge in the course of his seminars with major implications for the 
way the treatment is directed. Following Lacan’s statement that the 
transference is constituted by real, symbolic and imaginary 
dimensions, we will develop how, in terms of Lacan’s early work, the 
analyst’s presence represents a phenomenon at the crossroads between 
the world of signifiers and images. For Lacan during the 1960’s and 
after, the analyst’s presence necessarily involves the Real. This means 
that it points to the moment symbolization has reached it’s limits. The 
clinical implications of Lacan’s interpretation of the presence of the 
analyst that incorporates the Real are manifold and affect 
psychoanalytic practice with regard to the position and the 
interventions of the analyst. Specifically, interventions targeted at 
provoking changes in defenses against experiences of excess or 
senselessness are discussed and illustrated through case vignettes and 
a published case. This paper discusses how transference can be 
considered to be “the navel of the treatment” pointing to the necessity 
of traumatic material to emerge in relation to the analyst. 
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“It cannot be disputed that controlling the phenomena of transference 
presents the psychoanalyst with the greatest of difficulties. But it 
should not be forgotten that it is precisely they that do us the 
inestimable service of making the patient’s hidden and forgotten erotic 
impulses immediate and manifest. For when all is said and done, it is 
impossible to destroy anyone in absentia or in effigie” (Freud, 1912, 
p. 108). 
 
Introduction 
Transference is still, more than a century after Freud’s “The Dynamics 
of Transference” (1912a), a central concept for clinicians of most 
psychoanalytic schools (Almond, 2011; Esman, 1990; Verhaeghe, 2008; 
Fink, 2007; Harris, 2012). The citation at the top of the page is the final 
sentence of this fundamental text that has been subjected to many 
interpretations. In this closing remark, Freud points to the necessity of 
transference to actualize the obscured and the forgotten, in spite of the 
difficulties transference inevitably produces in the treatment. 
Psychoanalytic treatment implies “the imperative to work in the 
transference” (Almond, 2011). However, how analysts deal with 
transference depends on the conceptualization they have of 
transference, as theory and praxis are intertwined (Lacan, 1964). 
Almond (2011, p. 1146) points to the orienting role of theory in the 
“clinical moment”. This means that the theoretical frame an analyst 
adheres to, is related to the analyst’s stance toward the patient. We will 
examine how the presence of the analyst is developed theoretically in 
Lacanian psychoanalysis. Furthermore, we will discuss how these 
developments affect the analyst’s interventions. Thus, the central 
question of this paper is “what does the theoretical development of ‘the 
presence of the analyst’ by Lacan imply for the handling of 
transference today?” We will develop how the presence of the analyst 
from seminar XI on, points to the importance of the actualization of the 
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Real, aspects of Being that cannot be grasped via language (Vanheule, 
2011, p. 4) in analysis. The analyst’s interventions, consequently, are 
not only aimed at the deciphering of transference or unconscious 
formations, but at provoking the 
construction/deconstruction/reconstruction of a defense against an 
experience of excess or senselessness. We will illustrate these 
implications with a recently published case study as well as a clinical 
vignette from our own practice. We focus on clinical work with 
neurosis in this paper. 
The syntagm ‘presence of the analyst’ is discussed by the French 
psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan in the seminar, that he held weekly in 
Paris from 1953 on until shortly before his death in 1981. The seminars 
were attended by the Paris intelligentsia, not limited to psychoanalysts 
per se, but also philosophers, artists, students, academics, etc. 
(Roudinesco, 1999). Lacan discusses ‘presence’ as it relates to the 
analytic process at two separate instances with a 10-year interval. It is 
first brought to the fore in his first seminar on Freud’s technical papers 
and then again in seminar XI. The resurfacing of this term coincides 
with a change of Lacan’s principal perspective on the nature of the 
analytic experience from the Symbolic, stressing how subjectivity is 
shaped and expressed discursively, to the Real, pointing to a 
dimension beyond signification where chance or contingency, 
uncertainty, shock and senselessness become principal topics. The 
analyst, then, is no longer solely a symbolic support but also a 
provocateur, with a highly idiosyncratic style: 
“I am a clown. Take that as an example, and don’t imitate me!” 
(Lacan, 1974. In: Nobus, 2016, p. 37)    
The root of Lacan’s elaboration of the analyst’s presence can be found 
in Freud’s famous remark that “No one can be destroyed in absentia or 
in effigie” (Freud, 1912, p. 108). Lacan elaborates this Freudian 
statement starting from the antonym of absentia: presence. The 
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question ‘how is the analyst present?’ is answered in different ways 
throughout the development of his theoretical work. “The presence of 
the analyst” represents a junction where separate registers are involved 
and momentarily get tied together. First we will situate the conceptual 
triad of the Imaginary, the Real and the Symbolic, a crucial compass for 
Lacanian psychoanalysis. Then, we will outline how the presence of 
the analyst is situated at the nexus between the registers of the 
Imaginary (the ego) and the Symbolic (language) in seminar I and 
between the Symbolic and the Real in seminar XI. We will outline the 
implications of this shift in Lacan’s thinking on transference and what 
it implies for the analyst’s interventions. 
 
The three registers: Imaginary, Real and Symbolic 
The dimensions of the Symbolic, the Imaginary and the Real are the 
basic building blocks of Lacanian psychoanalysis. These registers 
occupy a central place throughout Lacan’s work from the 1950’s on. 
Lacan had set out to re-interpret the central concepts of psychoanalysis 
through a highly ideographic reading of Freudian concepts, using 
these three registers as a new conceptual tool1. Lacan’s emphasis on the 
dimension of the Symbolic in analytic practice was one his major 
innovations in psychoanalysis (Vanheule, 2011). The Symbolic is the 
order of language and the law (Van Haute, 2002) and refers to the fact 
that our mental life and the analytic process is inherently structured 
through language (Strubbe & Vanheule, 2014). When Lacan refers to 
the law he points to the acquisition of culture-specific viewpoints 
thanks to which we experience the world as lawful and organized. 
Lacan adopts the notion of signifiers from Saussure to designate the 
essential building blocks of language. According to Saussure, speech is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  The	  three	  registers	  are	  very	  much	  inspired	  by	  contemporary	  prevailing	  sciences:	  French	  
structuralism,	  Kojève’s	  interpretation	  of	  Hegelian	  philosophy,	  ethnography,	  anthropology,	  
animal	  studies	  and	  of	  course,	  Freudian	  psychoanalysis.	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composed of signifiers and signifieds. The latter are the ideas or 
representations that speech evokes and thus are the semantic content of 
speech. Lacan adopts the idea of Saussure that there is no fixed relation 
between the signifier and the signified and as such, meaning is, in 
essence, unstable and boils down to convention (Vanheule, 2011, p. 36).  
For Lacan, the unconscious is made of the collective of signifiers 
and stories that a subject has received from significant others, 
determining the subject’s identity, symptoms, dreams, lapses, etc. 
(Willemsen et al., 2015, p. 777). What Lacan emphasizes through his 
concept of the Symbolic, is how subjectivity, meaning and the 
unconscious are dependent upon the mechanisms of language. The 
core of subjectivity is constituted by otherness: “the unconscious is the 
discourse of the Other” (Lacan, 1957, p. 10).  For Lacan, meaning is not 
the expression of an interior state, but is constituted from outside, from 
what he calls the Other; it refers to language as a collection of signifiers 
and signifieds and to significant others (parents, educators, family, 
etc.). This dimension of otherness becomes most clear if we consider 
how subjects are first and foremost born into a web of words. Parents 
already talk about their desire for a child even long before the actual 
conception. They talk about the desired life through signifiers that 
circulate in familial and cultural discourses. The different stories they 
tell are marked by their history, their desire (and thus also their lack). 
In the case of the Rat man, for instance, the message of the father that 
he will become either a great man or a criminal has determining effects 
in terms of his neurosis (Freud, 1909, p. 205). The psychoanalytic 
subject exists as a result of an experience of loss (Wilson, 2006). 
Thinking, representation and desire are possible because of a 
constitutive lack.2     
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Wilson	  (2006)	  clarifies	  how	  lack	  and	  representation	  occur	  simultaneously	  for	  Lacan:	  “Using	  
Freud’s	  theory	  of	  the	  Fort!	  Da!	  game	  as	  a	  model,	  Lacan	  asserted	  that	  the	  child	  becomes	  a	  
desiring	  subject	  through	  speaking	  the	  loss	  it	  is	  experiencing.	  The	  child’s	  mother	  is	  gone;	  she	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The Imaginary is the central register for Lacan during the 1950’s. He 
used the model of the mirror stage, to explain how a sense of 
psychological unity and identity are attained. Originally, the mirror 
stage was considered to be a developmental phase, where children 
from 6 months on, are able to recognize their image in the mirror. This 
recognition is accompanied by a sensation of jubilation and triumph. 
The core idea behind Lacan’s use of the Imaginary is that this 
recognition is supported by an image in the outside world. 
Consequently, self-awareness is misrecognition3 at root, since we 
wrongly assume that we ‘are’ the image. Lacan situates the (Freudian) 
ego on the axis of the Imaginary. The basic identifications acquired 
through the mirror image are formative of this ego. Not only is the ego 
not the master in it’s own house, but the house itself is a mirage. In 
analysis, the Imaginary occurs for instance, when the patient engages 
in (objectifying) attempts to grasp an image of him/herself (Van Haute, 
2002, p. 84): “I am a person that likes structure”, “Giving things away 
is just in my character”, “I am a sad person”, etc.   
The Imaginary not only structures our self-experience but also how 
others are perceived. In the Imaginary register, others are experienced 
as similar to oneself. Whereas the Symbolic is characterized by lack, the 
perpetual movement of the signifier, giving rise to a divided subject 
that can never coincide with it’s self, the Imaginary is characterized by 
meaning and fullness. It is in this register that objects in the world and 
others are perceived as distinct and delineated entities. Here, the image 
of self and other are co-existent and have a reciprocal relation to each 
other. Imaginary relations are characterized by mutuality, (narcissistic) 
love and hate/rivalry. For Lacan, analysis needs to counter imaginary 
tendencies, since in terms of the analytic process they constitute 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
desires	  elsewhere”	  (p.	  405).	  The	  dialectic	  relation	  between	  lack	  and	  meaning	  is	  an	  important	  
psychoanalytic	  topic,	  both	  in	  theory	  as	  in	  clinical	  work	  (Wilson,	  2006).	  	  
3	  For	   this	   reason,	  Lacan	  was	  highly	  sceptical	  of	   the	  notion	  of	  a	  “conflict	   free	  sphere”	  or	  an	  
autonomous	  ego.	  He	  firmly	  rejected	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  subject	  adapted	  to	  reality.  
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resistance to the movement of the signifier. In focusing on our 
‘personal’ preferences, our ‘I’, we tend to deny the drive and the 
fundamentally divided nature of our being a subject.  
The Real is the third register put forth by Lacan to grasp what happens 
in the psychoanalytic experience. Although the meaning of the term 
also changes throughout his work, it cannot be equated with ‘reality’.  
The Real is an effect of the fact that we are speaking beings. During the 
early seminars, the Real is that which is outside language and is 
inassimilable to symbolization (Evans, 1996). The Real thus refers to 
human experience to the extent that it cannot be articulated through 
language and discourse, nor turned into an image. It bears likeness to 
the Freudian drive and refers to a tension that insists at the borderline 
of the biological and the psychological (Verhaeghe, 2008). One of the 
ways the Real can manifest clinically is as panic attacks, attesting to an 
overwhelming drive excitation (Strubbe & Vanheule, 2014). Grotstein 
(2007) believes that the Lacanian Real is akin to Bion’s O:  “being just 
beyond the veil of illusion on our way to the unknown that is 
immediately near, both inside and out” (p. 123). Both the Real and O 
are unknown. Furthermore, this register points to aspects of being 
outside “deterministic certainty” (p. 123). We will return to this central 
aspect of Lacan’s thinking in our discussion of seminar XI.  
As humans speak, they lose an immediate, unmediated contact with 
the Real. The reality is from then on a symbolic reality, mediated by 
language. The result is a divided subject (fragmented by different 
signifiers), only experiencing unity via imaginary identifications and 
relations. Note that the focus in this paper is on Lacan’s works from the 
1950’s until 1964, and hence on aspects of Lacanian theory where the 
unconscious and otherness are articulated primarily together with the 
Symbolic. Lacan later developed ideas concerning alterity from the 
vantage point of the real unconscious and real elements in affects4, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  See	  for	  instance	  Soler	  (2011).	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implying a different elaboration of presence. However, the root of 
these elaborations can be found in seminar XI, which we will discuss 
extensively.   
    
Lacan and transference  
For Lacan (1953-1954), transference involves the three registers of the 
Symbolic, the Imaginary and the Real. The transference is polyvalent 
implying that it is related to the signifier, to images of the other and 
self, to the body, and to what is beyond representation. Nevertheless, 
this polyvalence is not in itself perceptible, as we only become aware of 
transference at certain moments of the analytic process.  
For Lacan, it is impossible to think of the analytic relationship as 
consisting of the encounter between two persons or psychologies5. 
Thus, transference can’t be understood simply in relation to what 
mediates the relation between two subjectivities. At this point Lacan 
introduces the dimension of “lack” as crucial to our understanding of 
transference. It is not hard to see how this dynamic of lack relates to 
analysis. A patient comes to analysis because he/she perceives that 
something is lacking in his/her life (at least in case of neurosis). The 
solution to this lack is perceived to lie in the analyst. This is what he 
coins as “the supposed subject of knowing”6. The analyst is held to 
detain this object (knowledge) that completes the analysand. Put 
differently, the analyst attains the function of a guarantor, his presence 
guaranteeing that the result of free association will actually produce 
something that is meaningful, even though neither analyst nor 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Lacan	  developed	  an	  intersubjective	  take	  on	  transference	  in	  the	  early	  fifties,	  following	  
Kojève’s	  reading	  of	  Hegel.	  However,	  in	  his	  seminar	  on	  transference	  he	  states	  that	  “the	  
transference	  alone	  is	  an	  objection	  to	  intersubjectivity	  […]	  it	  refutes	  it,	  it	  is	  its	  stumbling	  
block”	  (Lacan,	  1967	  In:	  Nobus,	  2000,	  p.	  123).	  	  
6	  We	  opted	  to	  translate	  the	  French	  “Sujet	  supposé	  savoir”	  in	  this	  way.	  Some	  authors	  	  (e.g.	  
Grigg,	  2009)	  adopt	  the	  translation	  “subject	  supposed	  to	  know”.	  We	  choose	  to	  put	  the	  
‘supposed’	  in	  front	  since	  it	  is	  both	  the	  subject	  and	  the	  knowledge	  that	  are	  supposed	  to	  exist	  
somewhere,	  for	  Lacan.	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analysand knows what it means (Grigg, 2009). Of course, in Lacanian 
analysis, the analyst does not identify with the position of the 
supposed subject of knowing, but uses the analyst’s status to set in 
motion the analysand’s questioning of what it is that she is suffering 
from (Lacan, 1960 – 1961). The analyst’s desire constitutes an answer to 
the analysand’s aspiration and aims at provoking the exploration of the 
unconscious. This reduces the supposed subject of knowing to a sort of 
illusion, albeit a productive and necessary one. This is why Lacan 
states that the transference is deceptive (Lacan, 1951, p. 184). It is 
deceptive inasmuch as it is supported by a supposition that puts the 
analyst in the place of knowledge. 
  
Seminar I: Presence as resistance to the revelation of subjectivity 
Lacan (1953-1954) introduces the idea of the presence of the analyst, 
based on a remark made by Freud in The Dynamics of Transference7 that 
he describes in a modified version:  
“Just when he seems ready to come out with something more 
authentic, more to the point than he has ever managed to come up with 
up to then, the subject, in some cases, breaks off, and utters a 
statement, which might be the following – I am aware all of a sudden 
of the fact of your presence” (Lacan, 1953- 1954, p. 40).	  	  
In this quote, Lacan describes moments in the analytic process where 
free association is interrupted and a patient expresses an awareness of 
the analyst consequently. This was the case for Jane, for instance, a 
young woman struggling with the question of what direction to take in 
her professional life. She suddenly stops talking about her sad and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  “For	  our	  experience	  has	  shown	  us	  –and	  the	  fact	  can	  be	  confirmed	  as	  often	  as	  we	  please	  –	  
that	  if	  a	  patient’s	  free	  associations	  fail	  the	  stoppage	  can	  invariably	  be	  removed	  by	  an	  
assurance	  that	  he	  is	  being	  dominated	  at	  the	  moment	  by	  an	  association	  which	  is	  concerned	  
with	  the	  doctor	  himself	  or	  with	  something	  connected	  with	  him.	  As	  soon	  as	  this	  explanation	  is	  
given,	  the	  stoppage	  is	  removed,	  or	  the	  situation	  is	  changed	  from	  one	  in	  which	  the	  
associations	  fail	  into	  one	  in	  which	  they	  are	  being	  kept	  back”	  (Freud,	  1912,	  p.	  101).	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depressed mother, who always blamed her daughter for having failed 
in life. She silently looks at the analyst, then breaks out in laughter. 
“You really are a serious bunch, you lot”. Jane often tries to please the 
analyst by making “funny” remarks about how analysts behave. 
However, the analyst does not respond in laughter. In one session, Jane 
recounts how her parents always said she was “an artist”. The analyst 
repeats this statement “you are an artist”, because in Jane’s particular 
dialect, the expression “to be an artist” has a connotation of being 
someone who doesn’t take things seriously. It is used in reference to 
people who act silly. This brings about associations on how Jane 
always tried to make her mother laugh, so she would feel better. 
Moreover, she has suffered a severe lack of confidence, because her 
parents were very dismissive of her creative nature. In fact, Jane 
actually consulted because her creative career (as an “artist”) was at a 
standstill. At an unconscious level, being inhibited regarding work 
meant being loyal to her parents. The point we want to make here is 
how the “funny” remarks she made involving the analyst constituted a 
moment of interruption of the associations. Moreover, it was through 
an interpretation at the level of the signifier “artist” that the 
multiplicity of meanings surrounding her behavior vis-à-vis the 
analyst emerged. Indeed, when the presence of the analyst comes to 
the fore in the process of psychoanalysis, one type of Lacanian 
intervention consists of trying to reintegrate such imaginary standstill 
in ongoing free-associative speech.          
Specifically, in Seminar I Lacan opposes empty speech (or mediation)  
to full speech (or revelation). To the extent that something is not 
revealed in speech, this speech acquires the function of mediation 
between a subject and an other (Lacan, 1953- 1954, p. 49). Moreover, 
the other “comes into being in this very mediation” (Lacan, 1953- 1954, 
p. 48). This thought is ‘vintage Lacan’. Jane mocks the analyst, not 
because she experiences him to be a rather silly creature, but rather as 
an effect of what she cannot say at that time (the deprecation she 
12	  
	  
endured from her parents). The other is not some precondition of the 
analytic experience, but is rather constituted by it. In a more everyday 
setting, this is similar to how one might resort to small talk in order to 
avoid touching upon difficult subjects. However, in analysis this 
conversational pathway is not chosen deliberately. Rather, the 
awareness of the analyst manifests because something cannot be 
revealed. Following Lacan, transference arises as an obstacle to free 
association; it is a moment of resistance within a specific conversational 
context.  
Indeed, the presence of the analyst is realized as a substitute for an 
authentic expression of the unconscious by the patient. Instead of this 
“authentic expression” we get a sudden awareness of the presence of 
the analyst. This transferential moment is consequently related to a 
moment in discourse that has to be understood in relation to what is 
about to be said, but isn’t. It is a discursive phenomenon related to 
resistance. As such, it indicates the point where the utterance of 
something is avoided or deflected.  
The other is realized as such by speech, at a time where discourse 
moves to a point that is hard to say. Full speech is the progressive 
unfolding of subjectivity in authentic speech. Empty speech is 
objectifying and puts us at a distance from what really moves us (Van 
Haute, 2002, p. 48). Later, this is taken up again as imaginary and 
symbolic aspects of speech and transference8. The former being related 
to a reciprocal relation between equals, to affect and to the conscious 
features of what is called ‘the small other’, meaning the concrete other 
that appears as similar to ourselves (an imaginary partner or mirror 
image). The symbolic aspects are related to the big Other, to the 
structuring and often unconscious relations between the subject and 
linguistic and societal structures. Within this view, transference is an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Lacan	  develops	  this	  through	  his	  L-­‐schema	  that	  is	  constituted	  by	  2	  axes	  (imaginary	  and	  
symbolic).	  Good	  introductory	  and	  thorough	  explanations	  of	  the	  L-­‐schema	  can	  be	  found	  in	  
Willemsen	  et	  al.	  (2015)	  and	  Vanheule	  &	  Arnaud	  (2016).	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obstacle inasmuch as the analyst is realized as a concrete (small) other, 
as a counterpart to the analysand’s ego. It is the domain of the 
Imaginary governed by affect, by reciprocity and mutuality between 
two complementary counterparts, two egos, which are believed to be at 
the service of ignorance and resistance. The presence of the analyst is 
manifested at the crossroads between these two functions of speech.    
Seminar XI: presence as a manifestation of the unconscious 
Whereas in seminar I, Lacan describes presence from the perspective of 
(imaginary) resistance that obstructs the work of symbolization, 
Seminar XI embraces a view of the analyst’s presence as a 
manifestation of the unconscious.  
Indeed, Lacan takes up the question of the analyst’s presence again in 
seminar XI. In retrospect, this seminar is a turning point, along with 
the seminar on anxiety the year before, because it sets the stage for a 
focus on the Real in psychoanalysis. Verhaeghe (2001) describes 
seminar XI as a “hinge between the Lacan of the signifier and desire 
and the Lacan of the Real” (p. 72). The shift implies an interest in 
subjectivity at the limits of the Symbolic (Vanheule, 2011). The focus on 
the Real brings Lacan to a reinterpretation of some of the classic 
psychoanalytic concepts: repetition, transference, drive and 
unconscious. In the opening lesson, Lacan refers to psychoanalysis as a 
“praxis” (p. 6): “It is the broadest term to designate a concerted human 
action […] to treat the real by the symbolic”. Moreover: “The fact that 
in doing so he encounters the imaginary to a greater or a lesser degree 
is only of secondary importance here.” Lacan clearly puts the 
interrelation between the Real and the Symbolic on the agenda. The 
Imaginary becomes of secondary importance. The ego is now in the 
background. Whereas Lacan at the outset believed that through the 
Symbolic, a subject was able to absorb the Real, the Lacan of seminar 
XI does not grant the Symbolic with these powers. The Real is not a 
wasteland, waiting to be cultivated, rather it is the insistence of an 
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excess. Whereas the early Lacan assumed a symbolic determinism 
(symptoms and the psychoanalytic process are dependent upon the 
mechanisms of language), he adds an aspect of indeterminism to this, 
in the guise of an incessantly resurging Real that interrupts the 
symbolic machine. Key to understanding how Lacan interprets the 
fundamental psychoanalytic concepts of the unconscious, repetition, 
transference and the drive is to consider these concepts in relation to 
the central questions of causality and determination, core themes in 
seminar XI.  
Lacan approaches the interrelation between chance9 and determinism 
through the concepts of tuchè and automaton that he borrows from 
Aristotle’s theory on causality (Verhaeghe, 2002). Automaton refers to 
the causality we associate with the functioning of machines, 
determined by strict laws and as such constituting a closed circuit. In 
terms of the analytic process, it points to the determining effects of 
language and to the repetition of signifiers. If we associate “freely” the 
same old stories, words, themes and preoccupations return. One might 
think of how the signifier “rat” returns numerous times in different 
guises in the case of the Rat-man, referring to the father’s difficulties in 
choosing who to marry (Heiraten), but also pointing to money and of 
course the ugly rodents from the punishment (Declercq, 2004). 
However, there is a limit to the Symbolic. Something beyond words 
that Lacan relates to trauma keeps popping up. It is a missed encounter 
in that the experience cannot be inscribed through the signifier, while 
at the same time it insists in mental life, just as is the case for traumatic 
dreams that are repeated compulsively. This is the ‘tuchè’ component, 
the open and living side of repetition beyond words. Over and over 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  The	  later	  Lacan	  elaborated	  on	  the	  role	  of	  chance	  in	  life,	  generally,	  and	  in	  love	  and	  
the	  analytic	  process	  specifically	  in	  the	  1970’s:	  “Such	  are	  the	  happenstances	  that	  
drive	  us	  from	  pillar	  to	  post,	  and	  from	  which	  we	  shape	  our	  destiny,	  for	  we	  are	  the	  
ones	  who	  weave	  it	  thus.”	  (Lacan,	  1975-­‐1976,	  p.	  142).	  In	  this	  paper,	  ‘chance’	  and	  
‘contingency’	  are	  exchangeable	  terms.	  We	  will	  not	  go	  into	  later	  elaborations,	  where	  
‘contingency’	  is	  articulated	  through	  the	  categories	  of	  Aristotelean	  logic. 
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again, we try to grasp what moves us (through the symbolic), 
producing a remainder. This leftover pushes us again to speak more to 
grasp the insisting Real. This process continues constantly: language 
and its limit are caught up in this circular dance.   
The unconscious is related to this undetermined Real: 
 “For what the unconscious does is to show us the gap through 
which neurosis is tied to a real – a real that may well not be 
determined” (Lacan, 1964 In: Verhaeghe, 2002, p. 130).   
This statement reveals how the unconscious is considered against the 
background of enigma (the Real). The unconscious may very well still 
be operating with symbolic material, but at its core this constitutes a 
cover-up for something that is beyond and amidst the realm of the 
Symbolic. The unconscious of seminar XI is not the unconscious that is 
a kind of reservoir of repressed elements and unavowed desires or a 
content that is temporarily unavailable. In seminar XI, Lacan describes 
how the unconscious is manifested in a flash. It is characterized by a 
pulsating movement, an alternation between opening and closing. 
When it manifests, it serves as a starting point for the production of 
signifiers. It is the undetermined aspect in the signifying chain, the gap 
that enables the structure to exist. In that sense, the unconscious is pre-
ontological. This means that it is not an aspect of psychic reality that is 
already caught in mental representations. After all, for something to 
exist for someone, it needs to be taken up in the signifying chain. The 
unconscious comes into being at the limits of the signifying chain, in a 
moment of discontinuity. The closing of the unconscious is the 
interruption of the signifying chain: it refers to the dimension of the 
Symbolic and the signifier. In seminar XI, the ‘presence of the analyst’ 
is understood as a manifestation of the unconscious. If we combine the 
idea with the unconscious that is marked by a pulsation between 
opening and closing, this means that this manifests in transference as 
well. Two seemingly paradoxical statements that describe the relation 
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between the unconscious and transference in seminar XI, pertain to this 
link: transference is the closing-up of the unconscious and “the 
enactment of the reality of the unconscious”. The closing-up of the 
unconscious refers to the interruption in the chain of signifiers: what is 
halted is the flow of words (Miller (2008 [1995]). This refers to the 
automaton aspect of repetition: the structured and underlying 
determination of the signifying chain. “The enactment of the reality of 
the unconscious” on the other hand, points to tuchè, to a dimension 
beyond the signifier.  What interrupts the working of the signifier is no 
longer the actualization of the analyst as an imaginary other (as in 
seminar I), but is related to an aspect of the Real, to non-represented 
aspects of the drive. The presence of the analyst is then an incarnation 
of the Real.  
Repetition occurs when a missed, traumatic encounter (beyond the 
pleasure principle) is integrated within the network of signifiers 
(following the pleasure principle) (Nobus, 2000). From then on, 
signifying repetition is distinguished from transference (Miller, 1995). 
That is to say, the essence of transference is not the signifying 
repetition characteristic of the symbolic (automaton):  
  «  […] the dimension that is always eluded when transference is 
at issue, namely, that transference isn’t simply that which reproduces 
and repeats a situation, an action, an attitude or an old trauma» (Lacan, 
1962 - 1963, p. 128). 
Transference does not merely amount to the repetition of a certain 
stance toward an infantile love object in the here and now of the 
analytic encounter. The Freudian scheme of the Oedipus complex does 
not suffice to situate the analyst within the transference. With this 
loosening of the relation between transference and repetition, Lacan 
points to the essentially creative function of transference, to the 
possibility of the analytic encounter to bring forth something new. The 
contingency of the encounter with the analyst is put to work in the 
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analytic experience, transforming it in necessity (Dolar, 1993). It is 
precisely toward the point of enigma that the analyst has to direct the 
treatment. The treatment doesn’t aim to clarify how the present is 
obscured by the shadows of past love, but rather to confront the 
patient with the Real that is at stake: the desire of the Other. For Lacan, 
the desire of the Other is essentially enigmatic. A subject can to a 
certain extent frame the Other through symbolic and imaginary 
representations, but there always remains an unexplained remainder to 
the Other’s involvement in the subject. It is in this zone of 
interpretation that the subject makes a choice, through the fundamental 
fantasy, as to what it is that the Other wants. In hysteria the subject, for 
instance, fantasizes about how she is what the Other is lacking. The 
fantasy is marked by an aspiration to the completion of the Other. The 
separation of transference and (signifying) repetition entails that 
transference is not connected to a determined point, residing in the 
history of the subject, but rather to enigma. Whereas before, if one 
makes transference dependent on repetition, transference could be 
‘deciphered’, reduced to its roots in the patient’s history, now it rests 
on an indeterminate encounter. Of course, both aspects are at play in 
analysis, but its structure is an alternation between determination and 
indeterminateness.   
Lacan links this aspect of the ‘tuchè’ to transference: 
 “The relation of the Real that is to be found in the transference 
was expressed by Freud when he declared that nothing can be 
apprehended in effigie, in absentia – and yet is not the transference 
given to us as effigy and as relation to absence? We can succeed in 
unraveling this ambiguity of the reality involved in the transference 
only on the basis of the function of the real in repetition” (Lacan , 1964, 
p. 54).  
This very dense quote, points to three possible figures of transference 
with different implications for how the treatment is directed (Silvestre 
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,1987). We will first discuss the analyst as effigy (imaginary), then as a 
relation to absence (symbolic) to conclude with the analyst as Real.  
The original use of the term “in effigie” by Freud probably refers to a 
certain practice whereby a crude representation of someone is used as 
a focus for contempt or ridicule and often hung up or burnt in public10. 
Hence, the phrase “to burn or hang in effigy”. A contemporary 
example would be to burn a photograph of a political leader as a form 
of protest. If Freud states that it doesn’t suffice to destroy someone “in 
effigie”, we could translate this as meaning that it doesn’t suffice that 
the analyst is there merely in an imaginary guise. Transference would 
then be a decoy, where the analyst is but the support of the patient’s 
imaginary projections, a pure illusion. However, if this were the case, it 
is hard to imagine how analysis could lead to modifications in 
symptoms or in the patient’s subjective position. This is akin to the 
Freudian version of transference, wherein analysis would, by 
implication, amount to some sort of correction of a wrong attribution 
(“It’s not me you are angry at, but your 
mother/father/brother/sister/uncle…”). The corollary of this 
theoretical position would be the dark-clothed and silent analyst acting 
as a ‘blank screen’.   
A second approach can be found in how Lacan interprets the presence 
of the analyst in seminar I. As discussed earlier, the presence of the 
analyst can be seen as that which substitutes for the unsaid, when the 
associations stop, as we exemplified through the vignette about Jane. 
The moment that the presence of the analyst is actualized is 
meaningful: it is indicative of repression.  The analyst’s presence is not 
the shadow of a former love, but a discursive phenomenon. Here, the 
analyst tries to steer the patient away from associations regarding his 
person, by pointing to the signifiers used at moments the analyst is 
addressed as (just) another person. Thus the focus is on the text (the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/effigy	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Symbolic) not the perception of the analyst (the Imaginary). This way, 
the patient can eventually completely articulate (full speech) what was 
left out.   
In these interpretations, the analyst is absent. He just lends his persona 
to the projections made by the patient. Furthermore, in as much as he is 
present, it is but as an effigy, an image representing someone (else). In 
both cases the analyst has to somehow lose his identity in order for the 
work to progress (either by untying a false connection or by attending 
to the signifier).   Still, there is a third feasible approach of transference: 
“The analyst is neither an absence nor an effigy but a presence, a body, 
real” (Silvestre, 1987, p. 59).  
The implications of incorporating the Real in transference are manifold. 
We will outline how the real presence of the analyst points to the 
element of surprise (cfr. tuchè) in the analytic encounter. Clinically 
significant episodes in analysis are related to these contingent 
moments of interaction that can provoke important further analytic 
work. We will briefly compare the similar concept of ‘enactment’ to the 
Lacanian approach to these moments.  
Lacan’s work at the time of seminar XI anticipated a lot of 
contemporary ideas and concerns about how the analyst becomes 
present in the course of the analytic process. First of all, it points to the 
importance of the “here and now”11 manifestation of transference that 
is obviously implied by the term presence. Second, the analyst impacts 
the treatment through her presence, not solely through absenting 
herself as a person (imaginary). Lacan expressed this through the 
‘desire of the analyst’, as opposed to the notion of countertransference.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Transference	  and	  trauma	  open	  up	  interesting	  avenues	  for	  reflection	  on	  the	  temporality	  of	  
the	  psychoanalytic	  process.	  We	  will	  address	  the	  clinical	  aspects,	  but	  interesting	  theoretical	  
elaborations	  on	  these	  topics	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Johnston	  (2005)	  and	  Bistoen	  (2016).	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The real analyst: a strange and clownish character 
From the perspective of Lacan in seminar XI, the analyst can become a 
real presence. It is a presence differing from the supposed subject of 
knowing (symbolic) and the analyst as a person or a familiar (mirror) 
image (imaginary). What is the nature of this presence?   
As real, transference manifests in its aspect of immediacy: it is the here 
and now of the encounter that is at the forefront, based on a contingent 
element. This contingency is made possible because of the 
indeterminate, open atmosphere of the analytic session -cfr. Lacan’s 
‘gardez-vous de comprendre’ or Bion’s ‘abandon memory and desire’12 
(Grotstein, 2007, p. 2). The presence of the analyst as Real, from a 
Lacanian perspective, does indeed refer to the possibility of the 
transferential bond to introduce novelty. Poland (1992), similarly, 
describes how transference is “an original creation” (p. 189). Poland 
emphasizes how the past is shaped by the present, attesting to a special 
temporality in psychoanalysis. 
The analyst as Real appears as an enigmatic presence. She manifests in 
the here and now, immediate, without a possibility of interpreting her 
in terms of patterns or historical schemes. The presence of the analyst 
as Real is thus the point where the radical otherness of the Other 
becomes actualized. For Lacan, the Other is fundamentally 
unknowable. If we meet the Other’s radical otherness, this provokes 
anxiety, horror even. This confrontation revolves around  the question 
“What does the Other want from me?”. The fundamental fantasy, for 
Lacan, is the (unconscious) interpretation of the desire of the Other, a 
defensive attempt to answer this question (Verhaeghe, 2008). The 
Other can never be fully known, comprehended or localized. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Of	  course,	  Lacan	  stressed	  the	  necessity	  of	  the	  analyst’s	  desire	  to	  get	  the	  analytic	  process	  
going.	  However,	  we	  don’t	  consider	  Bion’s	  use	  of	  ‘desire’	  here	  to	  indicate	  that	  the	  analyst	  
should	  be	  aloof,	  but	  rather	  as	  indicating	  an	  attitude	  of	  receptiveness,	  beyond	  understanding	  
and	  narrative	  constructions	  (opening	  up	  a	  space	  for	  the	  unconscious	  to	  emerge).	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fundamental fantasy, for Lacan, serves the function of allowing us to 
nevertheless orient ourselves in relation to this Other.  
The difference with Poland’s view where unconscious fantasy bridges 
past and present, is that from a Lacanian point of view the fantasy is 
constructed as an interpretation of a moment of ‘tuchè’ that is in itself 
nonsensical. So even if we agree that the present shapes the past via the 
encounter with the analyst, this is not based on a latent point of 
determination (such as unconscious fantasies), but rather through a 
structural point of indetermination (cfr. ‘tuchè’) that the work of 
analysis encounters inevitably. Both the actualization of the 
fundamental fantasy as well as the construction of a historical narrative 
are secondary to this encounter. For example, such fantasy actualizes, 
in how an obsessional patient often treats free association: she 
meticulously keeps on talking in order to avoid surprising 
interventions by the analyst. From a Lacanian point of view 
transference also carries an aspect that is pre-historical and post-
historical. The Real (analyst as tuchè) provokes both a defense as well a 
further elaboration through the signifier. This entails that the analyst 
destabilizes significations and incessantly provokes a restructuring of 
symbolic and imaginary material.  
A moment in a treatment conducted by the second author exemplifies 
how this Real aspect of transference is actualized through a contingent 
encounter with an aspect of the analyst that does not fit the established 
(symbolic and imaginary) framework of transference. Ethel is a woman 
in her forties. She decides to consult an analyst, after hearing one of his 
lectures. The beginning of the analysis reveals that this way of 
choosing her analyst is in line with an overall tendency to be infatuated 
with ‘knowledgeable people’. She has a deep regard for intellectuals. 
The transference is characterized by an idealization, based on the signs 
indicating the analyst as ‘knowledgeable’ (the lecture, being a 
university professor and published author). Ethel is very much 
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surprised that such an important person, as she perceives her analyst 
to be, even has the time to take her on as an analysand. However, one 
moment in the treatment shakes Ethel to the core. Upon showing Ethel 
out of his office, the analyst sees a spider on the doorstep and 
immediately crushes it with his foot. Ethel is flabbergasted and 
disgusted by this gesture. She cannot reconcile this aspect of the 
analyst with the image she has of him. Moreover, she entertains a deep 
respect for all life, and always asks her children to treat animals with 
kindness. She would first capture them before setting them free in the 
garden. The brutality the analyst manifests by his act is discordant both 
with her transferential ‘understanding’ of him, as well as her own 
ideals. It reveals the moment the analyst cannot be represented; he is 
(literally) unthinkable. In search of knowledge, she encounters death, 
destruction and an opaque enjoyment. In subsequent sessions, she 
associates this moment with her husband, whom for the first time is 
described as a ‘cruel man’, since he kills spiders too. This brings about 
a discourse about her marital problems, a topic that hadn’t been 
touched upon before.   
 Ethel approaches the analyst through the coordinates that can be 
understood (and to a certain extent disentangled) in the context of her 
life history, revolving around the signifier ‘knowledgeable’. 
Nevertheless, this aspect of transference can constitute a hindrance for 
the work of free association, inasmuch as a patient is too heavily 
attached to the image of the analyst as a respectable figure.  
The crushing of the spider can hardly be considered a classical 
intervention, in that it was never deliberated in advance to have an 
effect on the patient. Moreover, the analyst’s behavior is not verbal in 
nature. It is not a play on signifiers, a construction or an interpretation. 
Nevertheless, the effects on transference and the treatment process in 
general are profound. A contingent encounter with the analyst as Real, 
destabilizes symbolic and imaginary constructions marked by a 
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fixation on and infatuation with the image of the analyst and ideals of 
knowledge. This provokes a further elaboration of the unspeakable 
(rather than uncovering a hidden truth). The literature is rife with 
similar ‘incidents’ in or around the cure that prove to be very 
impactful. Poland (1992) provides an example where he hands over the 
phone in a spur-of-the-moment fashion to a patient because he cannot 
understand what the (Italian) interlocutor on the other side of the line 
is saying and he knows his patient to be fluent in Italian. This moment 
of complete contingence or ‘tuchè’ (Poland himself acknowledges that 
it was a behavior out of the ordinary for himself as well) has a 
profound impact on the treatment.  
We described these events as ‘contingent’ or ‘tuchè’ because of the 
element of surprise that characterize them (on both sides of the couch). 
Indeed, to systematically look for ways to anguish or upset patients 
would amount to sadism on the analyst’s side (as it would imply that 
some sort of libidinal satisfaction is operative in a systematic way of 
handling transference). From our perspective, these moments are not 
the acting out of unconscious meanings, but rather pure contingencies 
that are inscribed into a narrative only afterwards. 
The unexpected that appears this way can have an anguishing quality. 
However, it is also here that we would situate the analyst as a clownish 
character. If Lacan says “don’t imitate me”, it points to moments and 
interventions on the analyst’s side that can’t be scripted or calculated in 
advance, neither can they be mirrored from another analyst as if they 
were readymade techniques. Moreover, the analyst can thus provoke 
something new, from a more comical angle. This often leaves the 
analysand wondering about what kind of species the analyst is. 
Grotstein (2007, p. 33) beautifully describes how Bion had a dry sense 
of humor, but was also a Zen master to him. He was in the dark about 
the intentions of Bion, but the strange interventions hit a spot:  
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“Often when Bion spoke I did not understand much of what he 
was saying –and he said a lot- but I did seem to resonate with it 
preconsciously. It always had an effect.” (Grotstein, 2007, p. 33). 
If the analyst to a certain extent embodies what may be Real to a 
person, that is: unpredictable, impossible or shocking, this allows the 
traumatic experience to be worked over within the transference 
(Laurent, 2011 in Strubbe & Vanheule, 2014). This amounts to what we 
could somewhat paradoxically name ‘a therapeutic traumatization’. Of 
course, it is not the traumatization per se that is responsible for the 
therapeutic effects, but how the transference provides access to a 
different kind of material, namely the way a subject responds to the 
Real. It is the Lacanian version of the transference neurosis: the 
actualization of the Real in treatment opens up the possibility of a 
reorganization of psychic material via the Symbolic and the 
Imaginary13. 
The vignette above is similar to clinical moments that are described as 
‘enactments’ in the literature (Hirsch, 1998). However, in contrast to 
enactments, their relevance does not necessarily derive from an 
unconscious (re)action of the analyst to the patient. The Lacanian 
analyst will emphasize the opportunity this provides for the 
construction of a Symbolic framework to keep the Real at bay. The 
Lacanian analyst prompts the patient to “strive to put into words what 
he has never said before” (Fink 2007, p. 81). It is not assumed that the 
meaning of the event already exists in the analyst (unconsciously).    
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  The	  Real	  does	  not	  appear	  in	  the	  same	  way	  in	  psychosis	  or	  perversion.	  Transference	  in	  
psychosis	  is	  best	  described	  as	  dual	  (Verhaeghe,	  2008),	  because	  the	  Symbolic	  is	  not	  operative.	  
Analytic	  work	  with	  psychotic	  patients	  rests	  on	  their	  creativity	  and	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  clinician	  
to	  avoid	  incarnating	  a	  whimsical	  and	  almighty	  Other.	  However,	  this	  topic	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  
of	  this	  paper.	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 The desire of the analyst: the real motor   
What does including the Real in transference imply for the handling of 
transference by the analyst? Lacan does not seek an answer to this 
question via the concept of countertransference as many of his 
contemporaries had done (e.g. Lucia Tower whose 1956 paper Lacan 
discusses in seminar X in admiration), but rather puts the “desire of the 
analyst” at the forefront as a motor force in the treatment.  
‘Desire’ is a central concept in Lacan’s work. To understand it’s role in 
transference, we have to look at the relational model that underpins the 
analytic encounter for Lacan14. At the outset, desire was conceptualized 
as the desire for recognition (by the other). This implies that there 
exists a rapport between two desires, following the logic of 
intersubjectivity. However, from seminar VIII on, Lacan emphasized 
the disparity in transference. Transference entails asymmetry because 
of the supposed subject of knowing (cfr. supra). Moreover, he radically 
rejected the idea of an inherent, prescribed relation between desiring 
beings. This leads up to the idea, expressed throughout seminar XX, 
that “there is no sexual relation”, meaning that between two desiring 
beings, there is no prescribed or natural harmony. We deal with the 
Other’s desire via the screen of the fundamental fantasy15. This fantasy, 
that is largely unconscious points to “the lasting relation that was 
originally constructed between the subject and the Other on the basis 
of repeated exchanges at the level of desire and lack” (Verhaeghe, 2008, 
p. 227). Since there is no symmetrical rapport between desires, 
countertransference cannot be equated with the response to the 
patient’s transference, as if they were complementary. Renik (1993) and 
McLaughlin (1981) reject the term countertransference for similar 
reasons.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  We	  believe	  that	  neither	  a	  one-­‐person	  nor	  a	  two-­‐person	  psychology	  adequately	  describe	  
this	  model.	  In	  Lacanian	  analysis	  the	  ‘person’	  is	  considered	  as	  an	  exponent	  of	  the	  Imaginary.	  
Desire	  and	  lack	  are	  the	  principal	  focii.	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The desire of the analyst is first of all a desire that is related to analytic 
work per se. In that sense, for Lacanian analysts, the desire of the 
analyst is a function that is incarnated in the analyst. It is not to be 
confused, however, with their personal desires as they relate to the 
patient. In fact, inasmuch as these manifest themselves (vaguely as 
unease or in a more elaborated countertransference impasse), the 
analyst resolves these first of all in her own analysis or control sessions 
(supervision). The desire of the analyst is sustained in relation to these 
spaces outside of the consulting room. This doesn’t mean that Lacanian 
analysts strive towards a posture of aloofness: they too experience 
anxiety, joy, excitement, interest, disgust, … vis-à-vis their analysands. 
However, these countertransferential affects and experiences are taken 
as a cue to work through in the analyst’s analysis or control sessions. 
As such, countertransference is considered as a potential obstacle to the 
continuation of the analysand’s work. That is why Lacan stated that the 
analyst should “pay with his person” (Lacan, 1958, p. 490). Lacanian 
analysts will not express their experiences with regard to their 
analysands, nor will they explain why they act and speak the way they 
do. Fink (2007) considers this to be one of the reasons that Lacanian 
analysis will remain at odds with Anglo-saxon inspired 
psychoanalysis. We believe that it is important to explore moments of 
surprise (or enactments) after they have taken place by inviting 
patients to elaborate further on them. However, the analyst’s 
contribution will not be explored mutually with the patient but in a 
space outside of the consulting room.     
Wilson (2013) convincingly demonstrates how certain 
countertransferential impasses can be traced back to how the analyst’s 
desire for a particular experience of analytic progress is frustrated. In 
order to interpret the stalemate, one has to resort to the analyst’s 
desire, as obviously the analyst’s presence in the consulting room 
attests to her desire to engage in the analytic process. That the analyst 
operates with desire, also means that she keeps a spirit of being open to 
27	  
	  
surprise, of maximizing the possibility that the analytic hour is indeed 
an encounter. In that sense, the desire of the analyst is the underlying 
principle that guarantees the possibility of an encounter with the Real 
within the framework of an analysis.   
Transference has to be understood as a complex relation between 
absence and presence. Wilson (2006, p. 403) identifies ‘biases within 
our theory toward presence and plenitude’. We could say the opposite 
is the case regarding the early Lacan, who mostly stressed how the 
analyst should avoid an imaginary or ‘dual’ relation (Wilson, 2003), by 
incarnating an absence (not providing meaning, not responding from 
the role where the analyst is put in, abstinence or being the ‘dummy’ ; 
Lacan, 1958, p. 492). By avoiding the Imaginary, the analyst can be 
addressed as a representative of the symbolic order (the Other). 
Nevertheless, testimonies as that of Jean Clavreul in the documentary 
“Quartier Lacan” [Weiss, 2001] teach us how Lacan himself radically 
departed from a completely abstinent position: when Clavreul was at 
the psychiatric hospital, Lacan visited him multiple times to continue 
the analysis. The desire of the analyst is manifest here: it is a desire for 
the analytic work to continue. It doesn’t suffice to merely assume the 
position of listener for this, but often requires a more active (even 
directive) intervention. To operate with desire thus refers to an active 
invitation and endurance on the side of the analyst. Besides, it also 
refers to the ability of the analyst to contain anxiety in the face of the 
horror the patient is struggling with. Roudinesco (1999) recounts how 
Lacan dared to take on patients that were manifestly suicidal, whereas 
his contemporaries often refused to take on these patients.  
 
Presence in the case of Mr. P (Leuzinger-Bohleber, 2015)    
The case of mr. P is an illustration of how the Real in transference 
impacts treatment, regardless of the psychoanalytic school or current of 
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the analyst. Moreover, this analytic process exemplifies how dealing 
with the Real in transference strongly requires a desiring analyst, 
willing to encounter the horror that intrudes on this patient.  
Leuzinger-Bohleber (2015) demonstrates the importance of “the 
reactivation of the trauma in the analytic relationship” (p. 96), 
accompanied by helplessness and anxiety in analytic work (with 
depressive patients having a history of traumatic experiences) through 
the case of Mr. P, a man in his 50s having been in intensive 
psychoanalytic treatment spanning several years. However, Leuzinger-
Bohleber puts the emphasis on the aid a restored trust in the “helping 
object” might provide.  
Mr. P comes to analysis after a series of attempts at an array of 
different treatment modalities. The author emphasizes an episode early 
in Mr. P’s life, a “severe separation trauma” at the age of 4, where he 
was separated for a few weeks from his parents, without any contact. 
Mr. P consults with a series of complaints that do not represent a 
“classic psychoanalytic symptom”. What stands out, besides a 
chronically depressed mood, is the primordially ‘real’ (in a Lacanian 
sense) nature of the symptomatology: pain in the body, eating 
disorder, suicidal tendencies and sleep disorder. Mr. P seems to 
function in a mode of permanent crisis, attesting to the overwhelming 
presence of the Real in his functioning and the lack of symbolic and 
imaginary means to counter them. Leuzinger-Bohleber reports that Mr. 
P dreams about “a badly injured man lying by the side of the road – his 
intestines are hanging out and everything is drenched of blood” (p. 
612). The man in the dream is in a helpless situation, saying “Why is 
nobody coming to my aid?” Eventually, “a woman hands him the lid 
of a cooking pot –which he is meant to place over the wound”. The 
dream is connected to “the danger of a re-traumatization in the 
analytic relationship” (p. 625) by the author. The dream reported by 
the author undoubtedly expresses a quality of anxiety (Real). However, 
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it also shows an interesting attempt at treating the fragmenting of the 
body via an object (the cooking lid) offered by “the woman”. We 
interpret this dream as an expression of how through transference (the 
woman in the dream referring to the female analyst) Mr. P is able to 
treat the Real threat posed by the disintegration of the body. The lid is 
an element that covers up what is all too present here (the 
intestines/the inner body). In a more classic analytic setting, symbolic 
formations (e.g. dreams) would be deciphered. Nevertheless, in this 
case it is not so much the appeal to signification or meaning that is at 
the forefront of the analytic process. This is also evident from the way 
this patient handles the interpretations delivered by the analyst: 
“When, after five months of treatment, I cautiously indicated a 
likeness between his unbearable chronic widespread pain and 
his life-threatening illness in the home, Mr. P fiercely dismissed 
this with the words: “Now, don’t you start with this nonsense. 
Even previous therapists would repeatedly try to palm me off 
with the idea that the depression had something to do with the 
stay at the home. This is just absurd.” (p. 625) 
Mr. P insists that his symptoms have a physical cause and subjects 
himself to numerous medical examinations. When the analyst offers 
Mr. P an interpretation where she connects the symptom to an aspect 
of Mr. P’s life history, he refuses a possible link between the two. It 
does not at all provoke a symbolic elaboration, as he turns to an 
intensified appeal to medical discourse as a frame of reference to 
understand his complaints. This phase of treatment seems to have been 
marked by the sustained attempts at constructing a representation of 
the body in the transference, rather than providing insight or exploring 
meaning. The Real that manifests in the analytic process is, in our view 
generic and central to all analytic work.      
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Mr. P’s analyst struggled to come to terms with the difficulties posed 
by the treatment: “the processing of the traumatization, by contrast, 
confronted both the analysand as well as the analyst with the limits of 
the bearable” (p. 626). The following fragment nevertheless shows how 
it is the desire of the analyst to work with this patient, demonstrated by 
the phone calls made (representing a departure from the classical 
analytic frame), that gets the treatment going again:    
“In the third year of treatment, Mr P reacted intensely to the 
separation from the analyst. During a holiday break, he 
underwent a disputed medical operation (an operation on his 
nose), without discussing this with me. Following the operation, 
he found himself in a terrible state, and he was unable to work 
for the following two months due to massive headaches and 
chronic widespread pain, threatening circulatory failure and 
panic. He also cancelled the analytic sessions after the operation 
by email without giving any details or reason. Finally, I became 
concerned at such long interruptions; I decided to call him and 
thus found out about his serious physical and psychic state. 
Through several crisis intervention discussions via telephone, I 
was finally able to help him to emerge from the ‘black hole’” (p. 
626).  
This moment in the treatment is explained by the author as “directly 
acting out his early experience of separation” (p. 626). Even though it is 
beyond doubt that Mr. P can’t rely on the Other (concrete 
other/symbolic means) in certain moments of distress, it is not so 
much an absence that is on the front, but rather an excess localized in 
the body. Yet, through the phone calls the analyst enters the scene 
again, makes herself present, thus opening up a space for analytic 
work via desire. It is precisely through her active presence that the 
crisis and the experience of excess can be limited and elaborated 
symbolically. It is indeed a very existential question that is being 
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played out in transference: “Does the Other want to lose me?” Be that 
as it may, we believe that the analysis gets under way again because 
the analyst, through her actions, answers at the level of desire: I do 
want to work with you. This understanding of the case puts less 
emphasis on the element of repetition in transference (playing out the 
experience of separation).    
 
Discussion 
We argued how transference constitutes the “navel of the treatment”. 
Much as Freud (1900) describes how the interpretation of dreams runs 
up against a point where the different dream-thoughts can no longer 
be analyzed: “the spot where it reaches down into the unknown" (p. 
525), transference in its real dimension, is the moment the associative 
work is halted and the analyst appears as real. Analogous to the dream 
interpretation, this moment presents an aspect of the analytic relation 
that can’t be analyzed in the classical sense (reducing the manifest 
content to the latent thoughts). It presents the analyst as an 
“unknown”. In Lacanian terms, it is no longer a question of finding the 
roots in the Symbolic of how the analyst is perceived on the imaginary 
plane, at this point. The unknown is much more radical: the 
appearance of the analyst shatters the habitual frames the patient 
adopts to understand others and oneself. The aspect of the Real in 
transference is reminiscent of Freud’s (1920) discussion of the 
repetition compulsion in treatment: “But we now come to a new and 
remarkable fact, namely that the compulsion to repeat also recalls from 
the past experiences which include no possibility of pleasure, and 
which can never, even long ago, have brought satisfaction even to 
instinctual impulses which have since been repressed” (p. 20). Analysts 
thus serve a function beyond partners in the process of meaning 
making. Rather, they help to discover the non-sense and contingence 
that is at the heart of meaning and to find a way of dealing with this 
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non-sense. In order to reach this, the analyst has to be included in the 
suffering. We wholly concur with Bird (1972) who advocates that 
analysis needs to evoke the development of a ‘transference neurosis’. 
This prevents analysis being reduced to “an exploratory art” (p. 280). 
Transference neurosis, from a Lacanian viewpoint, is the actualization 
of the unknown, of chance, of non-sense. This necessitates endurance 
on the side of both analyst and analysand.  
The case of Mr. P exemplifies how psychoanalytic work involves 
different registers of psychic functioning. The case illustrates that the 
Real in transference is generic, in that it occurs independently from the 
theoretical current the analyst adheres to. How it occurs, however, is 
highly singular and depends on each specific encounter between an 
analyst and a patient. Mr. P starts analysis after a trajectory marked by 
the inability of different caregivers to address his many symptoms. 
This is hardly an uncommon starting point, as many analysts are 
familiar with receiving “hard cases”, where therapeutic means seem 
exhausted. Moreover, what is striking about this case is the 
predominance of corporeal elements, both in the patients’ complaints, 
as well as in what he perceives to be a solution. Mr. P suffers from 
sleep disorders, facial neurodermatitis, unbearable pain in his entire 
body and eating problems. Both before and during the analysis, Mr. P 
often expects the answers to his bodily disturbances to reside in 
medical discourse, eventually leading to an “acting out”: an operation. 
What is more: he only turns to analysis because his application for a 
retirement pension gets turned down. The case is marked by an acute 
sense of helplessness and demoralization. The excessive presence of 
anxiety related symptomatology contrasts heavily with an almost 
complete absence of the Other. The author understands this from a 
historical perspective (the separation at an early age), as an event with 
a historical truth. From a Lacanian perspective, anxiety is interpreted 
as a “lack of lack” (Strubbe & Vanheule, p. 244). The Symbolic is seen 
as the dimension instituting lack, against the overwhelming presence 
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of the Real. It is not so much the historical events, but the actual 
inability to regulate distress via the Symbolic that we perceive to be at 
the root of Mr. P’s suffering. 
Interestingly, in the course of his analysis, this also seems to creep up 
on the analyst, demonstrating how sustaining an analytic position 
requires some form of (psychic) endurance. The excess of free-floating 
anxiety is central to the suffering of this analysand. What Leuzinger-
Bohleber terms ‘embodiment’ summarizes much of the effects of the 
analysis: Mr. P is able to connect a part of his life history to the body 
via transference. The framework of analysis provides a means to 
elaborate real elements of suffering. This requires an active position in 
the treatment, where the analyst is “a friend of crisis” (Caroz, 2015, p. 
158). The desire of the analyst is operative here in terms of the 
determination to start and continue the analytic process. The analyst 
expresses this through the frequency of the treatment. Mr. P had been 
in different kinds of psychotherapy (and was prescribed different 
medications), leaving his symptoms largely unaffected. We believe that 
it is precisely the more laborious process an analysis requires in terms 
of frequency that enabled for the effects of Mr. P’s analysis. We also 
pointed to the intervention of phoning Mr. P after a prolonged absence 
as a manifestation of the desire of the analyst to keep the analytic 
process going with this patient.          
Despite their similarity in terms of the actualization of the Real 
presence of the analyst, the cases of Mr. P and Ethel are different in 
terms of how transference develops. In Ethel’s case, the imaginary 
dimension is very present at the outset of the treatment. To a certain 
extent, this leads to a Symbolic elaboration of Ethel’s fascination with 
knowledge. The moment the killing of the spider happens, this 
framework somewhat falls to pieces. We could hardly turn this 
intervention into a rule (‘in case of stagnation due to excessively 
positive transference: kill insects’). In that sense, the case also 
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demonstrates how contingent aspects of the encounter always play a 
role in the process of analysis. The case of Mr. P is much more complex 
in terms of the interplay between real and symbolic material. After a 
few months of treatment, the excessive presence of the Real is 
interwoven with the Symbolic through dream material. However, the 
analytic work is repeatedly interrupted by irruptions of emergencies, 
crisis, forcing the analyst to intervene with desire, not interpretation.  
Whereas the Real startles, shocks and immobilizes, analysis provides 
the means to symbolically elaborate these moments in treatment. The 
moments where the patient stumbles upon the Real, are precisely 
opportunities to construct a different way of treating the Real. 
The Lacanian approach to transference is similar to other modern 
perspectives where the actuality of transference is emphasized. 
Incorporating the Real in transference, means that the immediacy of 
the analytic encounter is of prime importance in the analytic process. 
Analysis revolves around the development of a transference neurosis 
(Verhaeghe, 2008; Bird, 1972). Without it, analysis would be reduced to 
a mere hermeneutic practice, an endless play on words, without any 
visceral impact. Nevertheless, from a Lacanian perspective, the 
transference neurosis is constituted by an encounter with the oddity in 
the analyst. So neither the metaphor of the analyst as a surgeon, nor as 
a surfer or skier (Renik, 1993) adequately grasps the Lacanian analyst’s 
position. That is why we proposed the analyst as a clown as one 
incarnation of this real presence: an odd and provoking figure.  
The Lacanian analyst supports the analytic process through her desire. 
This desire is an integral part of treatment, not an interfering factor 
(Kirshner, 2012). The analyst’s desire entails an endurance that is 
sustained through her own analysis, regular supervision and other 
forms of collegial reflection on the analytic work. Leuzinger-Bohleber 
described how she was able to maintain an analytic position through 
regular supervision. Analytic work is then always articulated in a 
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triadic structure between analyst, patient and these spaces outside of 
the dyad. The Lacanian analyst does not interpret transference, nor will 
she disclose her thoughts, feelings or associations regarding the 
analysand. Countertransference, if pervasive, is examined in 
supervision or analysis, so as to avoid imaginary stalemates. Inasmuch 
as certain emotions or experiences regarding the patient are hindering 
the progress of the analytic process, they are probably more focused on 
the person of the analyst than the work of analysis. The analyst’s desire 
is manifest as a sustained invitation to let the work continue. 
Considering transference from the perspective of the Lacanian triad of 
the Symbolic, Imaginary and Real opens up interesting avenues for 
intervention. Attention for the Real in treatment does not however 
exclude the work of searching for unconscious knowledge. It merely 
highlights the treatment as a dialectal interplay between a real 
destabilization and a symbolic working through of this real event. 
However, the early sessions of analysis are aimed at getting the flow of 
associations going. This evidently entails a (re)construction of a 
subject’s history in relation to their suffering, as well as an attention for 
the specific signifiers that marked a subject’s history. This work of 
symbolization and amplification (Miller, 1995) of meaning provides the 
context of an encounter with the Real. The navel of the treatment is 
relevant only in the context of the associative context that supports its 
emergence. Both processes cannot be considered in isolation. Insight, 
understanding and personal experiences of love, hatred and 
fascination (in short: the Imaginary) are present in every analytic 
context and necessarily so. However, from a Lacanian perspective, 
these imaginary phenomena do not orient the analytic process.    
We believe that a Lacanian perspective on transference can enrich the 
understanding of the process of transference. Moreover, we hope to 
stimulate the dialogue between different approaches.  
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